INTRODUCTION
The title of Professor Laurence Tribe's recent book, Abortion: Th e Clash of Absolutes, brings to mind the din and fu ry of battle. However, beyond the brash red, white, and bl ue book jacket, one finds not a battlefi eld, but a courtroom of quiet reason. The Harvard scholar's serene assessment of abortion rights promises to illuminate fo r a wide audience both why the de mands of pro-choice fe minists are not constitutionally extreme and why the purported policy compromises initiated by pro-life forces fa il to qualify as compromises at all. Indeed, Tribe's judicious defense of the liberal pro choice perspective has already fo und fa vor in surprising quarters. Journalist Nat Hentoff , the self-described "atheist civil-libertarian pro-lifer," praises Tribe's pres entation of the right to privacy as unusually "lucid."1
The "absolutes" Tribe refers to are the strongly held belief in a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy, and the equally strong belief in a fe tus's right to life . Professor Tribe's optimistic central thesis is that the clash between these absolutes is not an insurmountable obstacle to compromise: that the abortion issue need not produce irreconcilable conflict between groups fa voring women's rights on the one hand and those fa vor ing fe tal rights on the other. Acknowledging the development of seemingly ab solute values on abortion in contemporary America, Tribe maintains that "[f]ar fr om being inevitable outgrowths of the natural order of things, these competing values are socially constructed."2 He concludes that understand ing the social or igins of these competing values paves the way fo r genuine compromise.
The image of th e abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is apt in many respects, whether one views the values at stake as natural and immutable or, with Tribe, as socially constructed. The aptness of Tribe's image is strongly $ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Neil Freeman for his role in the preparation of this book review.
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suggested by at least a quarter century of public discussion and scholarly inquiry about abortion which centered on the "right to privacy" and the "right to life." But the image of the abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is also potentially misleading. Whether a woman's right to privacy ought to outweigh a fe tus's ri ght to life is but one normative question abortion policy raises. Tribe's unidimensional metaphor fails to capture other important questions that the abortion debate brings to mind. 3 Yet Tribe's profile of abortion policy is no mere sketch of a major public controversy. Details of history and constitutional theory make his study admirably complete.
My goals here are fi rst to convey the thrust of Tribe's perspective, and second to briefly evaluate Tribe's arguments fo r abortion privacy and against fe tal personhood. Arguing with special clarity, Tribe defends the constitu tional privacy doctrine and its application to abortion laws on grounds that will sound familiar to the legal academy. Revealing his considerable fe mi nism, Tribe's appeals to constitutional equal protection doctrines and to the history of gender roles to justify liberal abortion laws are more refreshing.
Falling only somewhat short when he attempts to defend claims that a wo man's right to choose is fu ndamental to constitutionally protected liberty, Tribe's critical response to claims made on behalf of the fetus fall s furt her fr om the mark.
II. WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

A. Privacy Losing Ground
Quite apart fr om the abortion issue, the idea of a fu ndamental right to priv acy is losing gr ound. Its demise was fo retold when, in Bowers v. Hard wick, the fu ndamental privacy right fa iled to protect sexual int imacy be-tween consenting adults.4 The Supreme Court in Bowers upheld a Georgia criminal statute under which a man was charged af ter police discovered him engaging in homosexual sodomy in his own home.
Arguably, Bow ers implied no adverse destiny fo r the ri ght to privacy doc· trine; the decision merely pronounced that the Court would limit fu ndamen· tal privacy protection to heterosexual intercourse, reproduction, and family life. However, the majorit y opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Cruzan v. Di rector, Mi ssouri Department of Health was more clearly a dirge. 5 In the name of Nancy Cruzan's "privacy," Justice Rehnquist asked only whet her her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest was violated by the Missouri Supreme Court's ru ling that "clear and convincing evidence" of her own wishes must be presented in proceedings brought to terminate life sustaining treat ment .
Why is the concept of a fu ndament al constitutional right to privacy--one requiring st rict judicial scrutiny-losing ground in the Supreme Court?
Why is the privacy argument fo r abortion rights not holding sway with vocal segments of the general public? What is the case fo r fe deral constitutional protection of abortion choice? Abortion: Th e Clash of Absol utes is perhaps best viewed as a respected scholar's response to just these questions.
Earl y in his book, Professor Tribe traces the evolution of women's consti· tutional ri ght to aborti on fr om Roe v. Wade6 to Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser vices.7 Tribe explains how, after pronouncing in Roe that women have a "fundamental" ri ght to decide whet her to have an abortion, the Court initially "issued a series of opinions both reaffirming the rules of Roe and ... applying them to specifi c cases."8 Yet, Tribe notes, a dramatic change in the composition of the Court in the 1980s winnowed the 7·2 Roe majority to a narrow 5· 4 margin. The Court's 1989 Webster decision pro· duced only "four solid votes to reaffirm Roe," after which "the tenuous na· ture of the constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy was evident to anyone who could count."9 Since the publication of Tribe's book, the Supreme Court has handed down new decisions upholding abo rtion re· strictions. The right to choose abortion has become more tenuous still.
With the ret irement of Justice Thurgood Marshall, abortion privacy is threatened with imminent extinct ion.
A number of academic commentators have been deeply critical of the legal ev olution Tri be soberly recounts. Reacting to Webster, Ronald Dwor kin accused the plurality of premising it s at tack on Roe on "stunningly ba d argument . " 1 0 Indeed, one may wonder whether the Court ma de any argu- 18 The majority held that "gag rule" regulations prohibiting the dissemination of medical information or advice about abortion were a rea sonable interpretation of earlier statutes prohibiting abortion-related activi ties in fa mily planning programs receiving federal fu nds. Justice Rehnquist argued fo r the majority that, without abridging constitutionally protected fr ee speech or due process, "government may 'make a value judgment fa vor ing childbirth over abortion, and ... implement th at judgment by the alloca tion of public fu nds.' " 1 9 Describing the majority analysis as "facile" and "disingenuous," Justice Blackmun co untered that First and Fifth Amend Less adeq uate is his account of the pr actical and conceptual links among constitutional liberty, abortion rights, and privacy. It is in explaining wh at privacy-in its several senses-has to do with constitutional liberty and abortion rights that Tribe's discussion falls somewhat short. This deficiency is si gnificant. Robert Bork, for exampl e, has argued not only that the gen eral right to privacy is not contained in the text of the Constitution, but al so that he cannot grasp the purported conceptual link between that ri ght and abortion. 37
To get a grip on th e connections among constituti onal liberty, abor tion rights, and privacy, it is useful to consider the interests of individuals that are threatened wh en governments attempt to curtail abortion choices. 3 8 In TiVhalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court in effect noted th ree main "privacy" in ten�sts am enabl e to legal protection: (1) an interest in autonomous decision making , (2) an interest in confidentiality, and (3) an interest in ph ysical n.4 (! 989) (plurality opir.ion), and Justice White's dissenting opinion in [Vol. 44: 179 seclusio n. 39 Privacy in all three of these important senses is at stake in the choi ce of co mpeting abo rtion po licies.
At issue primari ly is the interest of all wo men in making choi ces abo ut reproduction that are not mandated by go vernment. Autonomous choi ces, fr ee of the controlling interference of public officials, are "private" choices.
To believe in the ri ght to privacy, we need not beli eve that nature di vi des so cial li fe li terally into public and private realms.40 We can coherently de scribe the condition of being relati vely fr ee of the mo st di rect, consequential, and co mmonly offensive go vernmental interfe rence as our "privacy. 42. I explore this less familiar argument for abortion rights in Uneasy Access. A. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 54-8 1.
43. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 44. The Court invalidated state data-collection requirements that would place otherwise confi dential information about individual abortion patients into the hands of public authorities, condemn ing these requirements as unconstitutional indirect constraints on abortion rights guaranteed in Roe.
TR IBE'S JU DICIOUS FE #INISM
bodily integrity. He expressly rejected the argument of certain amici that cri minal abortion statutes should be constitutionally invalidated on grounds of interference wi th women's bodily integrity. Then, in one of the most con fu sing passages in Roe, he suggested that as pregnancy progresses a woman "cannot be isolated. "45 Because a woman and her fe tus fu nction as a bi olog ical unit, Justice Blackmun inferred that government has grounds under the constitution fo r li mi ti ng her autonomy.
The inference here, that women who lack privacy in the sense of physical seclusion therefore lack privacy in the sense of autonomous decisi onmaking, fa llaciously confl.ates two disti nct senses of "privacy." Moreover, Justice
Blackmun's characterizati on of pregnant women as ip so fa cto not "isolated" These admitted inadequacies were never a sign that a jurisprudence of fu ndamental privacy was inherently untenable. Indeed, the str ai ghtforward jurisprudence of privacy elaborated in Roe's progeny is not weighed down by the ambi gui ty and metaphor that marred the earliest eff orts. Th ornburgh ci tes the textual liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of sub stantive fu ndamental ri ghts, concluding that havi ng a choice about whether to bring a child into the worl d numbers among the constitutionally protected fu ndamental liberties.48 In fa ct, the argument of Th ornburgh is that few liberti es are more critical to the lives of young women than the abi lity pri vately to choose whether to be ar children. Ri ghts protecting sexual au ton omy, contraceptive choice, and abortion choice are therefore key resources fo r women. Tribe's sympathetic expli cation of the jurisprudence of Roe potentially reassures readers that there is a defensible constitutional argument fo r abor ti on ri ghts. But the ar gument Tribe defends has proven to be controvertible.
One kind of cri tic admits that the ri ght to privacy is fundamental and that aborti on is conceptually and practically li nked wi th privacy, but fai ls-even after all the social evi dence is in-to be persuaded that aborti on ri ghts are important enough to the experience of privacy to warrant constituti onal pro tection. Indeed, the fa ct that abortion ri ghts are not explicitly protected in the Constitution and are not universally demanded strikes some as evi dence that anti-aborti on statutes must not be a constitutionally si gnificant imposi tion on a fu ndamental ri ght.
Uncongenial to any "fundamental" conception of privacy rights, Chi ef Justice Rehnquist and Justice White maintain that the argument for treating abortion ri ghts as fu ndamental is particularly weak. 59 Closely reading the relevant precedents, they deny that aborti on ri ghts are deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the nation.60 They deny, too, that abortion ri ghts ar e essential to the concept of ordered li berty. 61 Because they beli eve abor ti on fa ils these constitutional tests, they conclude that aborti on privacy is not a fu ndamental right under the Fourt eenth Amendment.
Tribe's indir ect answer to these arguments is a hi storical survey of the roo ts of both the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" movements in thi s country fr om the Ameri can Revolution to the present. Tribe stresses an observation mentioned by Justice Blackmun in Roe. Abortion was legal and not uncom mon in 1ate ei ghteenth and early ni neteenth century America. 62 Because chi ldren were regarded as economic assets to western fr ontier fa milies, wo men who sought aborti ons were pri marily single women. Therefore, any negative connotati ons attached to abortion stemmed not fr om pro-life senti ments, bu t fr om the view that premarital sex was immoral. 63
However, abor ti on at this ti me was by no means as safe a procedure as it is today-Tr ibe ci tes a 30 percent death rate for all surgical abortions in The doctors were spurred by two concerns. First, for both safety and business reasons, they wished to eliminate the performance of abortions by irregular physicians and by apothecaries promising miracle abortion tech niques. Second, the notion that the fe tus is a human life gained increasing acceptance throughout the medical profession. An elite profession with an increasingly technical appreciation of inner anatomy, they drew moral con clusions fr om the physiological fact that the unborn come to possess dis tinctly human traits many weeks prior to delivery from the womb. To advance their views, physicians organized a national lobbying effort, using arguments designed to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the people.
These included assertions that abortion is murder, which infl uenced the powerful Catholic Church, and that abortion poses a threat to traditional sex roles by enabling women to escape their duty as child bearers. 66
In time, the efforts of the medical profession "altered the prevailing atti Despite the checkered history of the concept of privacy in the Western world and the failure of privacy arguments to be completely persuasive in practice, abandoning privacy arguments in favor of an exclusive reliance on equal protection arguments is not the answer. To be sure, equal protection analysis avoids the "substantive due process" quagmire of the privacy-as fu ndamental-liberty argument. Yet it does so only at significant cost.
Viewed solely as a matter of equal protection, women's reproductive aspira tions must be fr amed in public legal discourse on the model of men's lives.
Viewed as a matter of privacy, abortion rights clearly entail equality, and yet women are better able to assert that the autonomy they seek reflects their own experiences, rather than being the strict analogue of the autonomy men enJoy.
It may be possible to make a case fo r abortion rights that does not ex pressly refer to privacy. 82 However, I conjecture that most American wo men would be unable to articulate fu lly their concerns about anti-abortion laws without appealing to notions of privacy. In talking about abortion, wo men commonly say that government should mind its own business. By us ing the term "privacy" in connection with abortion, women are able to draw is of paramount moral concern.
Despite the importance of autonomous decisionmaking for women, some believe that the human life developing in utero is invested with a special moral quality. Christopher Stone calls this quality "considerateness."8 3
Others have labelled it "personhood," "potential personhood," "humanity,"
or "potential humanity." I will call this quality personhood, although few would say that the traits of self-conscious, rational, moral agency usually associated with personhood exist in a fu lly realized fo rm in the unborn. Still, it is this quality that some see as making the state's interest in fetal life mor ally compelling.
The argument that it is morally wrong for a woman to procure an abor rights and related rights of bodily integrity is arguably severe. Yet, taking a different tack, it can be argued that our society has good reason for prefer ring the potential of the woman over that of the unborn.
Preferring adult women is a way of rewarding the effort and self-disci pline that virtually every adult must bring to the conduct of his or her life.
It is also a way of respecting plans and ambitions that may be inconsistent with pregnancy or parenting. It is, finally, a way of acknowledging the spe cial risks of pregnancy to health and wellbeing, and the value, to each person who can consciously choose, of being able to control such risks. Except per haps in a grossly underpopulated community, these considerations favor pre fe rring the potential of the pregnant woman to that of the fet us. Professor
Tribe does not, as I do, baldly state that society should prefer women's po tential to that of their fe tuses. However, he does plainly imply an overvalua tion of the fe tus and an untenable undervaluation of women.
As interesting as this sort of moral reflection on the subject of abortion is, 
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Historicaily. even when abortion was criminalized in America, it was a lesser crime than murder. P. 121. indicate what specifi c principles should guide legal thinking about the consti tutional rights of the unborn.
In keeping with his philosophy of "law as integrity," one would expect Dworkin to view the law as containing identifiable norms of exclusion dis cemable through constructive interpretation.9 3 Dworkin appears to fo llow his own prescription fo r legal reasoning when, with respect to fetal per sonhood, he argues:
The question is one of legal interpretation. The principle that the fe tus is not a constitutional person fits better with other parts of our law and also with our sense of how related issues would and should be decided if they arose than the rival principle that it is. . . . Apart fr om anti-abortion stat utes, there are fe w signs in our la w of the kind of regulation of pregnancy that would be appropriate if the fe tus were a constitutional person, and the Supreme Court has never suggested any constitutional requirement of such protection. 94
When Dworkin invokes "our sense of how [fetal personhood] issues would and should be settled," to whose sense is he appealing? Perhaps that of the pro-choice fo rces within the community, with whom he happens to agree?
The evasion of discord and ambiguity implicit in Dworkin's appeal to "our sense" of how related issues would and should be resolved is alarming. Both Tribe and Dworkin argue that if one deeply probes the totality of one's beliefs about law, it becomes clear that one does not, and cannot, be lieve that abortion is murder and the fe tus is a constitutional person. While fe minists may applaud this conclusion, the conservative, conventionalist, and positivist nature of the inquiry-"there are few signs in our law"-is not a distinctly "feminist" or otherwise progressive mode of analysis. Dworkin, especially, lays out no principles to ease the mind of someone who fe ars that Roe is really Dred Sc ott fo r the unborn. Tribe, on the other hand, obliquely addresses such fe ars by implying that those who oppose the right to choose abortion often subscribe to a constitutionally untenable tradition that subor dinates women. In fa ct, Tribe's rendition of women's history, rather than 93. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 94. Dworkin, supra note 92, at 50 (emphasis added).
any narrow constitutional argument, is at the heart of his claim against fetal personhood. 95
Another distinction between the approaches of Tribe and Dworkin arises out of Dworkin's claim that if a fetus is a constitutional person, then Roe v. Wa de is "plainly wrong" on equal protection grounds. Knowingly killing a person, says Dworkin, is a crime in every state. Focusing on equality be tween pregnant women and their potential children, Dworkin does not satis factorily answer the obvious concern about equality between women and men. Tribe, however, stresses that women have a right to live as fr eely and capably as do men. He thus avoids the trap that Dworkin falls into when his own requirement of "fit" conflicts with his equal protection analysis. Would a requirement that a woman carry her pregnancy to term fit a system of laws that otherwise eschews good samaritan duties? It seems doubtful. If this requirement were nevertheless imposed, how broad would the exception be?
One must ask whether the argument that mothers must make their bodies available to their children means, for example, that the state will require of a parent whose fa tally ill child needs a liver transplant that he or she donate a lobe to keep the child alive.
IV. THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE
Tribe illuminates why the privacy argument for access to medically safe abortions is not more popular and is losing ground in the courts. He never theless shows that the fu ndamental privacy and equal protection arguments for abortion choice are better than some critics imagine. Tribe attempts to reduce concern relating to the welfare of the unborn. However, he does not alter the fa ct that, for many, the fe tal personhood question is a genuine bar rier to wholehearted acceptance of constitutional privacy protection fo r abortion. It will remain so until acceptance of the fe minist version of the history of reproductive laws overtakes concern for the fa te of the unborn, or scholars like Tribe and Dworkin devise an appropriately persuasive argu ment fo r excluding, or limiting fr om consideration, the interests in and of the unborn.
The abortion debate in the United States illustrates that merely recount ing fe minist histories of women and reproductive law does not automatically convince pro-life proponents to abandon their demands fo r fe tal protection and take up arms fo r women's privacy and equality. Vigorous, secure pro choice abortion policies will require our society to more thoroughly value women, their judgments, and their contributions outside the home. Such a fu ndamental change in values cannot be legislated by fiat. Ultimately, fo r women's interests to be protected, the fo rce of law must be imposed on the unpersuaded, as it has been since Roe v. Wa de.
Although Tribe seems to appreciate the importance of judicial willin g- The idea that abortion rights rest secure outside of the political arena cannot be sustained in the present context. For Tribe, any realistic version of abortion compromise in this country must guarantee fe deral constitutional protection for choice. In the conclud ing chapters of his book, Tribe analyzes proposed "compromises" that do less than this, criticizing virtually all of them as attempts by the pro-life lobby to make abortions more difficult to obtain. Tribe then proposes what he regards as meaningful compromises, based on better contraceptive pro grams, childcare assistance, and new technologies. Regarding the fa lse com promises, Tribe argues that, "although the compromises are designed to sound reasonable, they would sacrifice much more than they would accom plish." 109 Spousal consent requirements, fo r example, are relevant only where a woman wants to have an abortion against her husband's wishes. In such a situation, the wishes of only one party can prevail, and it is illogical to fa vor those of the husband over those of the wife, since she is the one who must bear the child. Parental consent requirements, too, operate on the as sumption that the woman--or girl-should not make such an important de cision on her own. Yet, Tribe points out, this reasoning implies that the parents would also be entitled to compel their immature daughter to have an abortion-a provision which, of course, is found nowhere in the law. Both spousal and parental consent requirements rob women of due autonomy.
Parental notification requirements, while seemingly less oppressive than parental consent laws, share the unfortunate effect of compounding the stress and anxiety of a pregnant minor. The reproductive choices of minors are of grave concern to many families and communities and may therefore seem to warrant paternalistic public intervention. However, as Tribe points out, it makes no sense to impede fr eedom of choice by imposing parental notification requirements that guarantee no pregnant girl meaningful paren tal guidance, while placing some at risk of parental rejection or abuse. Thus, Tribe explains, the consent and notification laws, which sound like good fa ith attempts to foster fa mily communication, in practice achieve little good and may cause much harm to already distressed women. 110
Tribe takes particular exception to the abortion fu nding "compromise," which, with Supreme Court approval, restricts public support fo r poor wo men's abortions. Because the Court in Roe focused on the "negative" con cept of privacy, rather than the "positive" concept of equal protection, Tribe deems it "unsurprising that the Court later held that government has no constitutional duty to help women exercise [the right to obtain an abor tion] ." 1 11 It is not clear, however, that the privacy rationale of Roe is the true culprit. Surely the Court could read equal protection, no less than pri vacy, as merely a "negative" right of noninterference rather than a positive right t.o government assistance. Tribe nonetheless correctly argues that de nial of public fu nding for abortions in states where public assistance is avail able fo r childbirth but not fo r abortion creates a situation of inequality respecting indigent and affi.uent women and their fa milies. This situation of distributive inequity, "is really no compromise at all and seems particularly immoral." 112 Reproductive freedom is too important to be allowed to de- pend on so random a characteristic as the extent of a woman's wealth.
Professor Tribe thus argues that the commonly proposed compromises are not true compromises. Nominally, they purport to accommodate both pro-choice and pro-life viewpoints, but their real purpose is to reduce the number of abortions performed. These supposed compromises "promise abortion rights in principle but deny them in practice to those who are least able to bear the burden of motherhood-particularly the young, the unedu cated, the rural, and the nonwhite." 11 3 In order to achieve meaningful com promise, both absolutes must bend. The pro-life camp must recognize the rights of the woman, at least up to some point in pregnancy, as superseding those of the fe tus, and the pro-choice camp must acknowledge that the be liefs of a significant sector of American society strongly disfavor unlimited abortion rights. The political "compromises" that Tribe regards as one sided result fr om the lack of precisely this sort of bilateral concession.
In America, the most obvious starting point has been largely overlooked.
Both sides would agree that reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies is desirable. Tribe proposes lowering the incidence of unwanted pregnancies in two ways. First, childbirth should be made more affordable--through better postnatal care programs, mandatory maternity and paternity leaves, subsi 115. See Ross, supra note 3 (arguing that the death of the fe tl!S may be a reasonable and responsible preference).
political, and constitutional error. At a minimum, the Court's abandoning Roe would make it that much harder fo r other institutions to mediate the clash of absolutes. It appears that the political burden of championing lib eral abortion rights-which Tribe declares no woman should have to shoul der-will soon enough weigh heavily again on those who fa vor them.
